[PATCH 2/2] ima: Support appraise_type=imasig_optional

From: Vivek Goyal
Date: Mon Feb 11 2013 - 15:11:55 EST


appraise_type=imasig_optional will allow appraisal to pass even if no
signatures are present on the file. If signatures are present, then it
has to be valid digital signature, otherwise appraisal will fail.

This can allow to selectively sign executables in the system and based
on appraisal results, signed executables with valid signatures can be
given extra capability to perform priviliged operations in secureboot
mode.

Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 ++
security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index de16de3..5ca0c23 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Description:
uid:= decimal value
fowner:=decimal value
lsm: are LSM specific
- option: appraise_type:= [imasig]
+ option: appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig_optional]

default policy:
# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 3710f44..222ade0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -124,19 +124,26 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
const char *op = "appraise_data";
char *cause = "unknown";
- int rc;
+ int rc, audit_info = 0;

if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
- if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
+ if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
+ /* getxattr not supported. file couldn't have been signed */
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_OPTIONAL)
+ return INTEGRITY_PASS;
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ }

rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)&xattr_value,
0, GFP_NOFS);
if (rc <= 0) {
/* File system does not support security xattr */
- if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_OPTIONAL)
+ return INTEGRITY_PASS;
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ }

if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
goto out;
@@ -158,7 +165,8 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
}
switch (xattr_value->type) {
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
- if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ||
+ iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_OPTIONAL) {
cause = "IMA signature required";
status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
break;
@@ -201,8 +209,14 @@ out:
if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint))
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
}
+ if (status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL &&
+ iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_OPTIONAL) {
+ status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+ /* Don't flood audit logs with skipped appraise */
+ audit_info = 1;
+ }
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
- op, cause, rc, 0);
+ op, cause, rc, audit_info);
} else {
ima_cache_flags(iint, func);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 4adcd0f..8b8cd5f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -598,6 +598,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
+ else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig_optional")) == 0)
+ entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_OPTIONAL;
else
result = -EINVAL;
break;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 84c37c4..2ba736b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000
#define IMA_DIGSIG 0x01000000
#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x02000000
+#define IMA_DIGSIG_OPTIONAL 0x04000000

#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
--
1.7.7.6

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