> Show me a way of abusing phys_addr(2) which doesn't rely on root
> privileges and can't be done without phys_addr(2) (note that I can
> write an unprivileged programme which will punish your machine with
> resorting to phys_addr(2) at all).
There were plans to make mlock() available to normal users for
cryptographic purposes. There would be a quota to protect the
machine. If a user (or group of users) can get 1/32 of the pages
below 16 MB, then the system can not allocate 128 kB for DMA.
In general, it is bad to leak information.
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