Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read

From: Demi Marie Obenour

Date: Wed Nov 18 2026 - 19:43:56 EST


On 11/18/26 7:37 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 06:42:15PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
>> On 11/18/26 9:04 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote:
>>> This RFC proposes a key type, "keycrypt", whose material user space can
>>> use for symmetric operations but never read: AES-256-CBC, HMAC-SHA256
>>> and an authenticated AES-256-GCM stream, through a file descriptor that
>>> KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN returns for one key and one operation.
>>
>> I haven't looked at the API, but from a cryptographic perspective,
>> this encourages very poor practices. AES-GCM even allows userspace
>> to extract the secret authentication key.
>>
>> AES-256-CBC isn't a suitable mode on its own, unless it's combined
>> with a MAC in encrypt-then-MAC. Even then, it has a 2^64 birthday
>> bound, so it should only be used 2^48 times with a single key unless
>> the key is ephemeral.
>>
>> AES-GCM is not a suitable algorithm either. If you allow encrypting
>> with a key loaded from persistent storage, there is no way for the API
>> to ensure it is only used with a unique nonce. Nonce reuse leaks the
>> authentication key and allows forgeries. Using random nonces isn't
>> good enough either: NIST only allows 2^32 encryptions in this case,
>> and the API can't enforce that limit.
>>
>> For long-term keys, all of the following are much safer choices.
>> They have 192-bit nonces, which means that one can generate them
>> at random for each encryption without any problems.
>>
>> - XAES-256-GCM
>> - XChaCha20-Poly1305
>> - AEGIS-256
>>
>> AES-GCM-SIV is also okay, provided that you are fine with occasionally
>> leaking if two plaintexts are equal. This happens whenever there is
>> a nonce collision, so with probability 2^-32 after 2^32 encryptions.
>
> The exitential problem here is that KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN creates a circular
> relationship between the keyrings API and a specific key type.
>
> At hardware level I did not see any support for TPM, which narrows down
> the potential user base.
>
> The remaining potential user base is further reduced by those that use
> trusted keys; leaving out those who need to solve the assumed problem
> that only this patch set can presumebly sort out.
>
> And we don't really know at this point that cut. This is pretty much
> the break down of what is wrong here.
>
> If there is/was a problem to sort out, it should be so constrained that
> it should be as quick to describe as stepping over a nail really.
>
> These are the main topics what I would focus on.

This whole patchset looks like a solution looking for a problem.

The usual solution to something like this is a userspace service
like ssh-agent. Then you can do whatever key management you want.
That doesn't protect against root, but if someone can get root you
have bigger problems.
--
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)

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