Re: [ARM ATTEND] catching up on exploit mitigations

[Laura Abbott]

On 7/30/2013 12:05 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> I'd like to propose the topic of catching up to x86 exploit
> mitigations and security features, and potentially identifying
> ARM-unique mitigations/features that could be implemented. Several
> years ago, with Nicolas Pitre doing all the real work, I coordinated
> getting ARM caught up on things like userspace ASLR and
> stack-protector. Recently, based on work by Will Drewry, I ported
> seccomp-bpf to ARM. I'd like to continue this kind of thing, and I
> think it's overdue to examine this area again. A lot of work has
> already been done by grsecurity in this area (see
> http://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=3292), so it would be
> good to start there.
>
> While it may expose my current ignorance of low level ARM mechanics,
> I'd like to examine and discuss:
>
> - RO and W^X kernel page table protections (similar to x86's
> DEBUG_RODATA and DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX; it's not clear to me how much
> LPAE and PXN is already handling this, if at all)

We've had support for RO/NX on our tree for a while. I'm interested in 
attending the summit to share what we've done and to see how much of it 
could be mainlined.

> - something like x86's SMEP and SMAP (to deter kernel exploitation
> from userspace)
>
> - vector table protections (needs to be protected like the x86_64
> vsyscall table, RO, etc)
>
> - kernel ASLR (I'm close to having this upstreamable for x86)
>
> - fuzzing (is anyone running trinity or similar on the ARM tree?)
>
> - any other things ... ?

I'd add getting something similar to CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM for ARM. It 
wouldn't be a direct drop in to x86 but we have some usecases for a 
framework to hook into the arch_get_random_{int,long}. This is mostly 
useful for cases where we need random numbers before the kernel's 
entropy source is completely initialized. The last point is a separate 
discussion all together.

> Thanks,
>
> -Kees

Thanks,
Laura

--
Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum,
hosted by The Linux Foundation
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/