Re: [RFC 1/1] xattr: provide integrity. namespace to read real values

From: Vivek Goyal
Date: Thu Feb 14 2013 - 15:06:59 EST

On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 11:07:49AM +0200, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> User space tools use getxattr() system call to read values of extended
> attributes. getxattr() system call uses vfs_getattr(), which for "security."
> namespace might get a value of the xattr indirectly from LSM via calling
> xattr_getsecurity(). For that reason value set by setxattr and read by getxattr
> might differ.
> Here is an example of SMACK label, which shows that set and read values are
> different:
> setfattr -n security.SMACK64 -v "hello world" foo
> getfattr -n security.SMACK64 foo
> # file: foo
> security.SMACK64="hello"
> EVM uses vfs_getxattr_alloc(), which directly reads xattr values from the file
> system. When performing the file system labeling with digital signatures, it is
> necessary to read real xattr values in order to generate the correct signatures.
> This patch adds the virtual "integrity." name space, which allows to bypass
> calling LSM and read real extended attribute values.
> getfattr -e text -n integrity.SMACK64 foo
> # file: foo
> integrity.SMACK64="hello world"

Without knowing anything about xattr or LSM, to me it is odd that I
write an xattr using name "security.SMACK64" and read back the same
attribute using different name "integrity.SMACK64".

To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at
Please read the FAQ at