Re: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
From: H. Peter Anvin
Date: Wed Feb 13 2013 - 12:22:28 EST
On 02/12/2013 10:41 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
On Tue, 2013-02-12 at 22:33 -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
That is just batshit crazy. If you have CAP_SYS_RAWIO you can do iopl()
which means you can reprogram your northbridge, at which point you most
definitely *can* modify the running kernel.
Well right, that's the point of this patchset - it adds some extra
permission checks to some of the existing CAP_SYS_RAWIO checks.
CAP_SYS_RAWIO hasn't meant "I can perform arbitrary pio and mmio" for
years - it means "I can do things that might maybe break something
somehow". So sure, removing CAP_SYS_RAWIO would give us basically all
the security we want in a secure boot environment, but it would also
block things that we *want* to work.
So, let 's see...
Someone adds SYS_CAP_RAWIO to some places it definitely does not
Break all the *appropriate* (as defined)uses of SYS_CAP_RAWIO?
What the heck?
H. Peter Anvin, Intel Open Source Technology Center
I work for Intel. I don't speak on their behalf.
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/