Re: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot
From: Paolo Bonzini
Date: Wed Feb 13 2013 - 03:27:25 EST
Il 13/02/2013 07:33, H. Peter Anvin ha scritto:
>>> Sounds like you are thinking of CAP_SYS_ADMIN, but I don't really see a
>>> huge difference between MSRs and I/O control registers... just different
>>> address spaces.
>> Not having CAP_SYS_RAWIO blocks various SCSI commands, for instance.
>> These might result in the ability to write individual blocks or destroy
>> the device firmware, but do any of them permit modifying the running
No, they cannot.
> That is just batshit crazy. If you have CAP_SYS_RAWIO you can do iopl()
> which means you can reprogram your northbridge, at which point you most
> definitely *can* modify the running kernel.
> And some SCSI driver requires this??!
No, and that's why there is a patchset floating that lets you toggle
this ability with a sysfs control. This way you do not need
On non-x86 machines CAP_SYS_RAWIO is much less dangerous, especially
when coupled with file DAC.
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