Re: [PATCH] avoid entropy starvation due to stack protection

[Stephan Mueller]

On 11.12.2012 13:33:04, +0100, Stephan Mueller <smueller@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

Hi,

I just noticed a misuse of a variable in my initial patch
> +	if (r->limit == 2 && r->entropy_count >= r->poolinfo->poolwords)

Instead of r->entropy_count, the code should use entropy_count.

Please see new patch attached.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@xxxxxxxxxx>

---

diff -purN linux-3.6/drivers/char/random.c
linux-3.6-sm/drivers/char/random.c
--- linux-3.6/drivers/char/random.c    2012-10-01 01:47:46.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-3.6-sm/drivers/char/random.c    2012-12-12 11:06:23.443403746
+0100
@@ -404,11 +404,12 @@ static bool debug;
 module_param(debug, bool, 0644);
 #define DEBUG_ENT(fmt, arg...) do { \
     if (debug) \
-        printk(KERN_DEBUG "random %04d %04d %04d: " \
+        printk(KERN_DEBUG "random %04d %04d %04d %04d: " \
         fmt,\
         input_pool.entropy_count,\
         blocking_pool.entropy_count,\
         nonblocking_pool.entropy_count,\
+        kernel_pool.entropy_count,\
         ## arg); } while (0)
 #else
 #define DEBUG_ENT(fmt, arg...) do {} while (0)
@@ -428,7 +429,11 @@ struct entropy_store {
     __u32 *pool;
     const char *name;
     struct entropy_store *pull;
-    int limit;
+    int limit;    /* 0 -> no limit when extracting data (nonblocking)
+             * 1 -> limit extracted data based on entropy counter
+             * 2 -> no limit when extracting data and disabling
+             *      use of seed source once pool has full entropy
+             */
 
     /* read-write data: */
     spinlock_t lock;
@@ -443,6 +448,7 @@ struct entropy_store {
 static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS];
 static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
 static __u32 nonblocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
+static __u32 kernel_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
 
 static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
     .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],
@@ -469,6 +475,15 @@ static struct entropy_store nonblocking_
     .pool = nonblocking_pool_data
 };
 
+static struct entropy_store kernel_pool = {
+    .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1],
+    .name = "kernel",
+    .limit = 2,
+    .pull = &input_pool,
+    .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(&kernel_pool.lock),
+    .pool = kernel_pool_data
+};
+
 static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
     0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
     0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
@@ -613,6 +628,15 @@ retry:
             r->initialized = 1;
     }
 
+    /*
+     * An entropy pool that is marked with limit 2 will only be
+     * seeded by the input_pool until it is full of entropy.
+     */
+    if (r->limit == 2 && entropy_count >= r->poolinfo->poolwords)
+    {
+        r->pull = NULL;
+    }
+
     trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits, entropy_count,
                   r->entropy_total, _RET_IP_);
 
@@ -652,6 +676,8 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *b
     mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time), NULL);
     mix_pool_bytes(&nonblocking_pool, buf, size, NULL);
     mix_pool_bytes(&nonblocking_pool, &time, sizeof(time), NULL);
+    mix_pool_bytes(&kernel_pool, buf, size, NULL);
+    mix_pool_bytes(&kernel_pool, &time, sizeof(time), NULL);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
 
@@ -820,7 +846,7 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct e
     if (r->pull && r->entropy_count < nbytes * 8 &&
         r->entropy_count < r->poolinfo->POOLBITS) {
         /* If we're limited, always leave two wakeup worth's BITS */
-        int rsvd = r->limit ? 0 : random_read_wakeup_thresh/4;
+        int rsvd = r->limit == 1 ? 0 : random_read_wakeup_thresh/4;
         int bytes = nbytes;
 
         /* pull at least as many as BYTES as wakeup BITS */
@@ -868,7 +894,7 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_sto
         nbytes = 0;
     } else {
         /* If limited, never pull more than available */
-        if (r->limit && nbytes + reserved >= r->entropy_count / 8)
+        if (r->limit == 1 && nbytes + reserved >= r->entropy_count / 8)
             nbytes = r->entropy_count/8 - reserved;
 
         if (r->entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes + reserved)
@@ -883,7 +909,7 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_sto
     }
 
     DEBUG_ENT("debiting %d entropy credits from %s%s\n",
-          nbytes * 8, r->name, r->limit ? "" : " (unlimited)");
+          nbytes * 8, r->name, r->limit == 1 ? "" : " (unlimited)");
 
     spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
 
@@ -1037,6 +1063,21 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nby
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
 
 /*
+ * This function exports the kernel random number pool. It is of
+ * slightly less quality than the nonblocking_pool exported by
+ * the function get_random_bytes because once it is filled completely
+ * with entropy, it is never seeded again. Yet, the quality of the
+ * random bytes depend on the SHA-1 hash and should be sufficient
+ * for purposes like ASLR and stack protection.
+ */
+void get_random_kernel_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+{
+    extract_entropy(&kernel_pool, buf, nbytes, 0, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_kernel_bytes);
+
+
+/*
  * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
  * number generator if it is available.  The arch-specific hw RNG will
  * almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it
@@ -1110,6 +1151,7 @@ static int rand_initialize(void)
     init_std_data(&input_pool);
     init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
     init_std_data(&nonblocking_pool);
+    init_std_data(&kernel_pool);
     return 0;
 }
 module_init(rand_initialize);
@@ -1239,6 +1281,9 @@ static ssize_t random_write(struct file
     ret = write_pool(&nonblocking_pool, buffer, count);
     if (ret)
         return ret;
+    ret = write_pool(&kernel_pool, buffer, count);
+    if (ret)
+        return ret;
 
     return (ssize_t)count;
 }
diff -purN linux-3.6/fs/binfmt_elf.c linux-3.6-sm/fs/binfmt_elf.c
--- linux-3.6/fs/binfmt_elf.c    2012-10-01 01:47:46.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-3.6-sm/fs/binfmt_elf.c    2012-12-11 10:25:36.357094685 +0100
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *b
     /*
      * Generate 16 random bytes for userspace PRNG seeding.
      */
-    get_random_bytes(k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes));
+    get_random_kernel_bytes(k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes));
     u_rand_bytes = (elf_addr_t __user *)
                STACK_ALLOC(p, sizeof(k_rand_bytes));
     if (__copy_to_user(u_rand_bytes, k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes)))
diff -purN linux-3.6/include/linux/random.h
linux-3.6-sm/include/linux/random.h
--- linux-3.6/include/linux/random.h    2012-10-01 01:47:46.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-3.6-sm/include/linux/random.h    2012-12-11 10:31:45.033100217
+0100
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ extern void add_input_randomness(unsigne
 extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);
 
 extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+extern void get_random_kernel_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
 void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16]);
 

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