Re: [PATCH] crypto: force reset of cprng on allocation

From: Herbert Xu
Date: Tue Jan 27 2009 - 23:21:21 EST


On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 11:50:27AM -0500, Neil Horman wrote:
> pseudo RNGs provide predictable outputs based on input parateters {key, V, DT},
> the idea behind them is that only the user should know what the inputs are.
> While its nice to have default known values for testing purposes, it seems
> dangerous to allow the use of those default values without some sort of safety
> measure in place, lest an attacker easily guess the output of the cprng. This
> patch forces the NEED_RESET flag on when allocating a cprng context, so that any
> user is forced to reseed it before use. The defaults can still be used for
> testing, but this will prevent their inadvertent use, and be more secure.
>
> Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@xxxxxxxxxx>

Applied to cryptodev. Thanks Neil!
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