Re: [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 01/11] Introduce new LSM hooks wherevfsmount is available.

[Shaya Potter]

Kentaro Takeda wrote:
> ----- What is this patch for? -----
>
> There are security_inode_*() LSM hooks for attribute-based MAC, but they are not
> suitable for pathname-based MAC because they don't receive "struct vfsmount"
> information.
>
> ----- How this patch was developed? -----
>
> Two pathname-based MACs, AppArmor and TOMOYO Linux, are trying to merge
> upstream. But because of "struct vfsmount" problem, they have been unable to
e> merge upstream.
> Here are the list of approaches and the reasons of denial.

I know I'm late to the game in this, but as I recently asked about this 
and didn't get an answer, I'll re-ask my approach.

Why can't you do this

in lookup()

- resolve rules (not for single process, but for all processes) for said 
path and tag dentry (seem to already have a hook)

in permission()

- check tag based on current security context

in rename(),....

- drop dentry tag and force a lookup next time its used (invalidate dentry)

you then don't have to jump through hoops to handle things like symbolic 
links as they are handled implicitly.

the only place I can see this approach "failing" (as in different 
semantics than your approach) is

- hard links within a single namespace and bind mounts shared between 
namespaces (in that different rules would be resolved for different path 
names for the same file).

But from a security perspective, both would seem like a very bad idea in 
general that one would ant to prevent.  or to rephrase, why would you 
want to allow that?  What's the benefit in allowing that?
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