Re: [PATCH] [request for inclusion] Realtime LSM

[Chris Wright]

* Martin Mares (mj@xxxxxx) wrote:
> Hello!
> 
> > Yes, SETPCAP became a gaping security hole.  Recall the sendmail hole.
> 
> Hmmm, I don't remember now, could you give me some pointer, please?

Sure, the Wagner/Chen paper on setuid demystified has some references to
it IIRC.  http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~hchen/paper/usenix02.ps

> > This won't work, you can't increase the bset, which is hardcoded to
> > leave out SETPCAP.  Also, init is hard coded to start without SETPCAP.
> 
> If I read the source correctly, init is allowed to increase the bset,
> the other processes aren't.

Yes, you're right I forgot about that.

thanks,
-chris
-- 
Linux Security Modules     http://lsm.immunix.org     http://lsm.bkbits.net
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