Jesse Pollard <pollard@tomcat.admin.navo.hpc.mil> writes:
> It's not a bug, but a security feature. NO log to syslogd should be lost,
> since it may be related to an attack.
That's exactly the argument I'm always using to turn down change
requests like this. If the syslog() function could drop an entry and
not send it is easy enough for somebody who has something to hide to
overflow syslog() and then do the whatever s/he does not want to be
logged.
If anything has to be changed it's (as suggested) the configuration or
even the implementation of syslogd. Make it robust.
-- ---------------. ,-. 1325 Chesapeake Terrace Ulrich Drepper \ ,-------------------' \ Sunnyvale, CA 94089 USA Red Hat `--' drepper at redhat.com `------------------------ - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Mon Oct 23 2000 - 21:00:21 EST