On Sun, 2 Jul 2000, Horst von Brand wrote:
>
> So what? Just find out what distribution somebody is running, and check
> with that. Sure, it's a bit harder to do, but if you get it right for
> current Red Hat, Debian, and SuSE, you've got almost all.
Perhaps you run all the stock binaries on these distributions, I do not.
> > The patch also provides restrictions on links in a +t directory, it
> > also prevents users from making hard links to files they don't own. This
> > breaks a number of race exploits, like the old passwd race, amoung other
> > things.
> >
> > There are some restrictions on writes to FIFO's in +t directories
> > unless the FIFO is owned by the user or the FIFO is opened without the
> > O_CREAT flag.
>
> All this breaks POSIX (and many legitimate uses) big time.
If POSIX says I can't have something be secure, then screw POSIX. With
the patch applied, it's a configuration option whether or not you want this
behavior.
> > There is the ability to restrict access to proc, for applications where
> > you do not want one user from watching another, ps only shows a users own
> > processes, etc.
>
> That sounds reasonable.
But no doubt, someone here will object to it on quasi-religious grounds.
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.rutgers.edu
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Fri Jul 07 2000 - 21:00:11 EST