RE: Ke: Process Capabilities on 2.2.16, Sendmail problem revisited

From: pavel-velo@bug.ucw.cz
Date: Thu Jan 02 1997 - 19:47:07 EST


>> which spawned an entire OTHER
>> argument on how that should be done. (ext2+caps,elfcap,et al)
>
>Yep. Capabilities in ext2 is just wrong. Using ELF is merely bad.
>This is a UNIX clone you know; you can't make it into VMS.

Why not? Elfcap is simple hack that does not break anything. Capabilities *are* usefull for simple tasks already. I do not know about VMS, but current system has practical uses.

>Ever wonder why? The system is not compatible with UNIX.
>It isn't even safe. This is making MAC look easy, since at
>least MAC operates "outside" the normal security system.

elfcap-ed ping would be slightly more secure than current ping. What is unsafe on capabilities?

>I know one way to fix all this. It is not nearly as fancy, but at
>least it doesn't cause so many incompatibilities. Do the obvious.
>Have UID-to-capability and GID-to-capability tables in the kernel.
>Load them early in the boot or via a trusted daemon. This doesn't

That is just plain ugly. Elfcap is very nice compared to this.

>have any "way cool" inheritance algorithms to confuse admins and
>programs alike. It just works. Across an exec, capabilities must
>be fully enabled for compatibility. Capability-aware programs
>could disable unneeded privilege as the first step in main.

Is not dropping unneeded privileges exactly the thing the other person said he is doing?

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