Re: Unexecutable stack
Jesse Pollard (pollard@tomcat.admin.navo.hpc.mil)
Tue, 28 Dec 1999 15:01:48 -0600 (CST)
Steve VanDevender <stevev@efn.org>
>I do realize that a non-executable stack only raises the bar for
>exploit attempts. But when nearly all security exploits for the
>past several years have been stack buffer overruns on root-run or
>setuid-root programs, a non-executable stack really does make a
>practical difference. I'm really tired of hearing people dismiss
>practical security solutions because they don't protect against
>everything; no single security technique protects against
>everything. The only real way to achieve security is using all
>the techniques that you can, and thoroughness in system
>management and monitoring, to get as much protection as possible
>and detect the things you can't protect against.
Bravo.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jesse I Pollard, II
Email: pollard@navo.hpc.mil
Any opinions expressed are solely my own.
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