Re: [PATCH] userspace access in net-ioctl()s.

Daniel Kobras (daniel.kobras@student.uni-tuebingen.de)
Fri, 8 Jan 1999 20:38:54 +0100 (CET)


On Fri, 8 Jan 1999, Philipp Rumpf wrote:

> On Thu, Jan 07, 1999 at 04:21:52AM +0100, Daniel Kobras wrote:
> > copy_(from|to)_user() calls to behave the way I'd expected it to. Digging
> > a little bit further, I found the same in various other ioctl()-code in
>
> Is there any disadvantage of changing the kernel to use a struct containing
> a pointer for untrusted user pointers ? This would prevent most accidents
> with them, I think.

The best fix probably were to tell sendmail to not allow sending any
braindead patches to linux-kernel after 4am in the morning. Sorry for this
stupidity. But yes, the current situation does not look really satisfying
to me, as it relies on sizeof(struct some_private_config_struct) <=
IFNAMSIZ, which is not very intuitive, especially as the actual
relationship is hidden in the net core. Sadly enough, changing this would
imply breaking interfaces, which is even more crying for bugs.

Daniel.

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