Not really. Conferring extra priviledge onto an executable for merely being
owned by root breaks the well-known security model. It would be easy for
someone to chown an executable to root (without suid/gid bits) without being
aware of the consequences for a Sparc Linux box with 64-bit executables.
This discussion is pretty moot - until there's a clear idea of what sequences
cause problems, there's not much point trying to design a solution. If it's
a matter of simply not allowing mappings in the lower or upper 2^30 bytes of the
address space, that's pretty low cost. If its worse than that, then we need to
think crefully about it.
J
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.rutgers.edu
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/