Re: sys_chown() hits symlinks

chip@atlantic.net
Mon, 19 Jan 1998 09:30:02 -0500 (EST)

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According to Albert D. Cahalan:
> Linus Torvalds writes:
> > That's another issue - symlinks always have mode lrwxrwxrwx,
> > and nobody can change that, including root. So a "chmod -R"
> > should just ignore symlinks
>
> At one time, you were thinking of setuid symlinks.
> Have you changed your mind? It would be nice to have
> path traversal under another UID or GID while blocking
> some users.

If you're contemplating having chmod on a symlink ever be meaningful
at all, then maybe now would be a good time to prepare by making it
a no-op instead of following the symlink.

-- 
Chip Salzenberg              - a.k.a. -              <chip@pobox.com>
                 "We can shower it with neutrons."
             "Or we can do the Neutron Dance!"  // MST3K

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In reply to: Shachar Tal: "gcc 2.8.0 + kernel 2.0.33"