Re: [PATCH net v2] tap: clamp zero-copy copylen to remaining payload length

From: netdev-bot+sashiko

Date: Sun Nov 22 2026 - 07:10:55 EST


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issue(s) to consider.

Critical: 0 · High: 1 (1) · Medium: 0 · Low: 1

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- [High] Incomplete fix: tun.c has the same stale-heap leak and the patch
leaves it alone.
- [Low] The commit message understates the impact.

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] This problem wasn't introduced by this patch, but the `if
(!tap)` branch of tap_get_user() (drivers/net/tap.c:646-650) leaks the…

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tap: clamp zero-copy copylen to remaining payload length

This patch clamps the zero-copy copylen in tap_get_user() to the payload
left after the virtio header. Without the clamp, tap_alloc_skb() sizes the
linear area from hdr_len or GOODCOPY_LEN. zerocopy_sg_from_iter() only
fills the payload bytes that exist, so stale heap contents can be
transmitted.

> For example, a 246-byte padded virtio header and a 14-byte Ethernet
> frame leave only 14 payload bytes, but a zero hdr_len makes copylen 128.
> With a 512-byte virtio header, a guest-supplied hdr_len of 256 also
> passes __tun_vnet_hdr_get(): it checks hdr_len before skipping the
> padding. That makes copylen 256 for the same 14-byte frame.
> Larger padded headers can raise copylen as far as good_linear.

[Severity: Low]
Does this description understate the exposure? Both examples use padded
vnet headers set up by the host. That reads as if an unusual vnet_hdr_sz
is needed.

tap_get_user() calls tun_vnet_hdr_get() with features=0, so parsed_size is
sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr), which is 10. __tun_vnet_hdr_get() then does:

drivers/net/tun_vnet.h:__tun_vnet_hdr_get() {
...
if (hdr_len > iov_iter_count(from))
return -EINVAL;

iov_iter_advance(from, sz - parsed_size);
...
}

At that check, the count still includes the sz - 10 padding bytes. With the
common 12-byte header (VERSION_1 / MRG_RXBUF), a guest can set
hdr_len = payload + 2. Before this patch that made copylen = payload + 2,
so 2 uninitialized bytes went out with each packet. With the 20-byte hash
header the overshoot is 10 bytes.

The new min_t() already handles these cases, so the code is fine. Could the
commit message say that the default header sizes are affected too? Stable
and security triage will rely on it.

> diff --git a/drivers/net/tap.c b/drivers/net/tap.c
> index 2f19fb07bb2d4..f25c58d6e986b 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/tap.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/tap.c
> @@ -608,6 +608,8 @@ static ssize_t tap_get_user(struct tap_queue *q, void *msg_control,
> struct iov_iter i;
>
> copylen = clamp(hdr_len ?: GOODCOPY_LEN, ETH_HLEN, good_linear);
> + /* The remaining payload may be shorter than copylen. */
> + copylen = min_t(unsigned long, copylen, len);

[Severity: High]
Does tun_get_user() in drivers/net/tun.c need the same clamp? Its
zero-copy branch computes copylen the same way, and nothing bounds it by
len:

drivers/net/tun.c:tun_get_user() {
...
if (msg_control) {
struct iov_iter i = *from;
...
copylen = min(hdr_len ? hdr_len : GOODCOPY_LEN, good_linear);
linear = copylen;
iov_iter_advance(&i, copylen);
if (iov_iter_npages(&i, INT_MAX) <= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
zerocopy = true;
}
...
}

When zerocopy is set, tun_can_build_skb() returns false and copylen is not
reset to len. From there the path matches tap:

tun_get_user()
tun_alloc_skb(tfile, align, copylen, linear, noblock)
skb_put(skb, linear)
zerocopy_sg_from_iter()
copy = min_t(int, skb_headlen(skb), iov_iter_count(from))

Nothing writes the tail of the linear head, and it goes out through the
host stack and any bridged link.

tun_get_user() also calls __tun_vnet_hdr_get(), which the commit message
blames for case B. A tun device with IFF_VNET_HDR always has SOCK_ZEROCOPY
set. With experimental_zcopytx=1, vhost_net uses zero-copy for guest TX of
256 bytes or more. Either of these looks like it reaches the leak:

vnet_hdr_sz >= 242, hdr_len = 0 and a short frame (copylen = 128)
any vnet_hdr_sz > parsed_size, hdr_len = payload + (sz - parsed_size)

Would it make sense to fix this in __tun_vnet_hdr_get(), or in both
callers? Otherwise the tun path stays exposed after a stable backport of
this patch.

> linear = copylen;
> i = *from;
> iov_iter_advance(&i, copylen);

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but tap_get_user() returns early
further down when q->tap is NULL:

drivers/net/tap.c:tap_get_user() {
...
rcu_read_lock();
tap = rcu_dereference(q->tap);
if (!tap) {
kfree_skb(skb);
rcu_read_unlock();
return total_len;
}
...
}

This return comes before skb_zcopy_init(skb, msg_control) and before
uarg->ops->complete(). Can this leak the vhost zerocopy ubuf_info?

By this point, handle_tx_zerocopy() in drivers/vhost/net.c has already
marked the head as in progress and taken a reference on ubufs:

vq->heads[nvq->upend_idx].len = VHOST_DMA_IN_PROGRESS;
...
atomic_inc(&ubufs->refcount);

Because sendmsg returned success, vhost waits for vhost_zerocopy_complete()
to finish the job, and that callback never runs. The heads[] slot stays
VHOST_DMA_IN_PROGRESS, which blocks vhost_zerocopy_signal_used(). The
ubufs refcount never reaches zero.

Later, vhost_net_flush() (from release, set_backend or reset_owner) waits
with no timeout:

drivers/vhost/net.c:vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait() {
vhost_net_ubuf_put(ubufs);
wait_event(ubufs->wait, !atomic_read(&ubufs->refcount));
}

q->tap becomes NULL in tap_del_queues() when the macvtap/ipvtap link is
deleted while the queue fd is still attached to vhost-net:

RCU_INIT_POINTER(q->tap, NULL);

>From then on, every zero-copy guest TX takes this path. The process
releasing /dev/vhost-net can then hang in D state. tun does not have this
problem because tun_sendmsg() returns -EBADFD once the device is gone.

This looks like it dates back to commit 4f61f133f354 ("net: tap: NULL
pointer derefence in dev_parse_header_protocol when skb->dev is null").

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Sashiko AI review · https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20261118120102.3717000-1-graypanda.inzag%40gmail.com