On Tue, Jun 10, 2025 at 03:40:40PM +0100, Robin Murphy wrote:
On 2025-06-10 2:04 pm, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
On Tue, Jun 10, 2025 at 12:07:00AM -0700, Nicolin Chen wrote:
On Tue, Jun 10, 2025 at 12:26:07PM +0800, Baolu Lu wrote:
On 6/10/25 02:45, Nicolin Chen wrote:
+ ops = dev_iommu_ops(dev);
Should this be protected by group->mutext?
Not seemingly, but should require the iommu_probe_device_lock I
think.
group and ops are not permitted to change while a driver is attached..
IIRC the FLR code in PCI doesn't always ensure that (due to the sysfs
paths), so yeah, this looks troubled. iommu_probe_device_lock perhaps
would fix it.
No, iommu_probe_device_lock is for protecting access to dev->iommu in the
probe path until the device is definitively assigned to a group (or not).
Fundamentally it defends against multiple sources triggering a probe of the
same device in parallel - once the device *is* probed it is no longer
relevant, and the group mutex is the right thing to protect all subsequent
operations.
Yes, adding iommu_probe_device_lock to iommu_deinit_device() would be
gross.
but something is required to protect the load of
dev->iommu_group.. dev->iommu_group->mutex can't protect itself
against a race UAF on deinit.
READ_ONCE is good enough to protect from races with the probe path, no
need for iommu_probe_device_lock there.
In this case need to look at the PCI sysfs for races against the
iommu_release_device()/etc that is freeing the dev->iommu_group.
Maybe the sysfs is always removed before we get to release. Or maybe
the PCI FLR sysfs code should hold the device_lock..