Re: [Kernel Bug] general protection fault in btrfs_lookup_csum

[Qu Wenruo]

在 2025/6/7 03:24, Zhiyu Zhang 写道:
> Dear Developers and Maintainers,
>
> We would like to report a Linux kernel bug titled "general protection
> fault in btrfs_lookup_csum" on Linux-6.12.28, we also reproduce the
> PoC on the latest 6.15 kernel. Here are the relevant attachments:
>
> kernel config: https://drive.google.com/file/d/15zwNg6D0mF6eeFOw5zz4QkkH1bcK8xCl/view?usp=sharing
> report: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BPmRKH5Not1_y5briNsAcaYi0hXTe5um/view?usp=sharing
> syz reproducer:
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xvAUqtN1mu-49xfCObEYRn1eFc2Tmk8F/view?usp=sharing
> C reproducer: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cdDqjEqpqhoenhWzxF_GNc06kRkrrjxa/view?usp=sharing

This doesn't feel safe just accessing some unknown source.

Can you let the sysbot to reproduce and forward the report?

> The crash happens on every read I/O against a broken btrfs image whose
> checksum tree is missing/corrupted. Specifically,
> fs/btrfs/file-item.c:search_csum_tree() calls "csum_root =
> btrfs_csum_root(fs_info, disk_bytenr);", where csum_root can be NULL
> under certain on-disk corruptions. Then btrfs_lookup_csum()
> immediately dereferences root->fs_info, causing a general-protection
> fault / KASAN report.

Undermost case, if csum tree root is corrupted, btrfs can only be 
mounted with rescue=ibadroots, and in that case btrfs should set 
FS_STATE_NO_DATA_CSUM thus no one should trigger the csum tree search at 
all (btrfs_lookup_bio_sums() will exit early).

The only unknown exception is scrub, which is already fixed by 
f95d186255b3 ("btrfs: avoid NULL pointer dereference if no valid csum 
tree").


The call trace just looks like a regular page read, and we didn't have 
that FS_STATE_NO_DATA_CSUMS set, which isn't correct.

I'd prefer to dig deeper on finding out why.

Thanks,
Qu

> --- a/fs/btrfs/file-item.c
> +++ b/fs/btrfs/file-item.c
> @@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ btrfs_lookup_csum(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
>                    struct btrfs_path *path,
>                    u64 bytenr, int cow)
>   {
> +       if (unlikely(!root))
> +               return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); /* or -ENOENT, see below */
>          struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = root->fs_info;
>          int ret;
>
> With this draft patch the PoC no longer panics the kernel.
> search_csum_tree() converts -ENOENT (and -EFBIG) to 0, treating the
> range as “no checksum” and continuing safely. If we instead return
> -EINVAL, the error propagates upward and aborts the read outright. I
> am unsure which behaviour is preferred: (1) ENOENT: silently
> consistent with existing path handling and avoids spurious I/O errors;
> (2) EINVAL: treats the situation as fatal corruption.
>
> Advice on the expected semantics would be appreciated before I submit
> a formal patch.
>
> If the issue receives a CVE, we would be grateful to be listed as reporters:
> Reported-by: Zhiyu Zhang <zhiyuzhang999@xxxxxxxxx>
> Reported-by: Longxing Li <coregee2000@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> Please let us know if a different fix or additional diagnostics are
> preferred. We will be happy to respin the patch accordingly.
>
> Thank you for your time!
>
> Best regards,
> Zhiyu Zhang