2025-05-05T14:39:29-07:00, Atish Patra <atishp@xxxxxxxxxxxx>:
SENVCFG and SSTATEEN CSRs are controlled by HSENVCFG(62) andBasically the same comments as for [1/5]:
SSTATEEN0(63) bits in hstateen. Enable them lazily at runtime
instead of bootime.
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_insn.c b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_insn.c
@@ -256,9 +256,37 @@ int kvm_riscv_vcpu_hstateen_lazy_enable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int csr_
return KVM_INSN_CONTINUE_SAME_SEPC;
}
+static int kvm_riscv_vcpu_hstateen_enable_senvcfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned int csr_num,
+ unsigned long *val,
+ unsigned long new_val,
+ unsigned long wr_mask)
+{
+ return kvm_riscv_vcpu_hstateen_lazy_enable(vcpu, csr_num, SMSTATEEN0_HSENVCFG);
+}
Why don't we want to set the ENVCFG bit (62) unconditionally?
It would save us the trap on first access. We don't get anything from
the trap, so it looks like a net negative to me.
+The same argument applies to the SE0 bit (63) when the guest has the
+static int kvm_riscv_vcpu_hstateen_enable_stateen(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned int csr_num,
+ unsigned long *val,
+ unsigned long new_val,
+ unsigned long wr_mask)
+{
+ const unsigned long *isa = vcpu->arch.isa;
+
+ if (riscv_isa_extension_available(isa, SMSTATEEN))
+ return kvm_riscv_vcpu_hstateen_lazy_enable(vcpu, csr_num, SMSTATEEN0_SSTATEEN0);
+ else
+ return KVM_INSN_EXIT_TO_USER_SPACE;
+}
sstateen extension.
KVM doesn't want to do anything other than stop trapping and reenter, so
it seems to me we could just not trap in the first place.
Thanks.