[PATCH for-5.15 3/3] Documentation/hw-vuln: Add documentation for Cross-Thread Return Predictions

From: Paolo Bonzini
Date: Tue Feb 14 2023 - 12:10:51 EST


From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>

Add the admin guide for the Cross-Thread Return Predictions vulnerability.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
Message-Id: <60f9c0b4396956ce70499ae180cb548720b25c7e.1675956146.git.thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
.../admin-guide/hw-vuln/cross-thread-rsb.rst | 92 +++++++++++++++++++
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 +
2 files changed, 93 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/cross-thread-rsb.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/cross-thread-rsb.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/cross-thread-rsb.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ec6e9f5bcf9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/cross-thread-rsb.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions
+=======================================
+
+Certain AMD and Hygon processors are subject to a cross-thread return address
+predictions vulnerability. When running in SMT mode and one sibling thread
+transitions out of C0 state, the other sibling thread could use return target
+predictions from the sibling thread that transitioned out of C0.
+
+The Spectre v2 mitigations protect the Linux kernel, as it fills the return
+address prediction entries with safe targets when context switching to the idle
+thread. However, KVM does allow a VMM to prevent exiting guest mode when
+transitioning out of C0. This could result in a guest-controlled return target
+being consumed by the sibling thread.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+The following CPUs are vulnerable:
+
+ - AMD Family 17h processors
+ - Hygon Family 18h processors
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this issue:
+
+ ============== =======================================
+ CVE-2022-27672 Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions
+ ============== =======================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+Affected SMT-capable processors support 1T and 2T modes of execution when SMT
+is enabled. In 2T mode, both threads in a core are executing code. For the
+processor core to enter 1T mode, it is required that one of the threads
+requests to transition out of the C0 state. This can be communicated with the
+HLT instruction or with an MWAIT instruction that requests non-C0.
+When the thread re-enters the C0 state, the processor transitions back
+to 2T mode, assuming the other thread is also still in C0 state.
+
+In affected processors, the return address predictor (RAP) is partitioned
+depending on the SMT mode. For instance, in 2T mode each thread uses a private
+16-entry RAP, but in 1T mode, the active thread uses a 32-entry RAP. Upon
+transition between 1T/2T mode, the RAP contents are not modified but the RAP
+pointers (which control the next return target to use for predictions) may
+change. This behavior may result in return targets from one SMT thread being
+used by RET predictions in the sibling thread following a 1T/2T switch. In
+particular, a RET instruction executed immediately after a transition to 1T may
+use a return target from the thread that just became idle. In theory, this
+could lead to information disclosure if the return targets used do not come
+from trustworthy code.
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+An attack can be mounted on affected processors by performing a series of CALL
+instructions with targeted return locations and then transitioning out of C0
+state.
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+--------------------
+
+Before entering idle state, the kernel context switches to the idle thread. The
+context switch fills the RAP entries (referred to as the RSB in Linux) with safe
+targets by performing a sequence of CALL instructions.
+
+Prevent a guest VM from directly putting the processor into an idle state by
+intercepting HLT and MWAIT instructions.
+
+Both mitigations are required to fully address this issue.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+Use existing Spectre v2 mitigations that will fill the RSB on context switch.
+
+Mitigation control for KVM - module parameter
+---------------------------------------------
+
+By default, the KVM hypervisor mitigates this issue by intercepting guest
+attempts to transition out of C0. A VMM can use the KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS
+capability to override those interceptions, but since this is not common, the
+mitigation that covers this path is not enabled by default.
+
+The mitigation for the KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS capability can be turned on
+using the boolean module parameter mitigate_smt_rsb, e.g.:
+ kvm.mitigate_smt_rsb=1
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
index 4df436e7c417..e0614760a99e 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -18,3 +18,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
core-scheduling.rst
l1d_flush.rst
processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
+ cross-thread-rsb.rst
--
2.39.1