Re: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing

[Jiri Kosina]

On Wed, 25 Jan 2023, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:

> Argument that it doesn't work?  I thought that ship sailed a long time 
> ago but I could be wrong as I don't really pay attention to that stuff 
> as it's just vaporware :)

Greg, are you sure you are talking about *SEV-SNP* here? (*)

That ship hasn't sailed as far as I can tell, it's being actively worked 
on.

With SEV-SNP launch attestation, FDE, and runtime remote attestation (**) 
one thing that you get is a way how to ensure that the guest image that 
you have booted in a (public) cloud hasn't been tampered with, even if you 
have zero trust in the cloud provider and their hypervisor.

And that without the issues and side-channels previous SEV and SEV-ES had.

Which to me is a rather valid usecase in today's world, rather than 
vaporware.

(*) and corresponding Intel-TDX support counterpart, once it exists

(**) which is not necessarily a kernel work of course, but rather 
     userspace integration work, e.g. based on Keylime

-- 
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs