On 4/27/22 07:37, Juergen Gross wrote:
On 27.04.22 14:28, Borislav Petkov wrote:
On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 08:37:31AM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
On 26.04.22 19:35, Borislav Petkov wrote:
On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 03:40:21PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
/* protected virtualization */
static void pv_init(void)
{
if (!is_prot_virt_guest())
return;
+ platform_set_feature(PLATFORM_VIRTIO_RESTRICTED_MEM_ACCESS);
Kinda long-ish for my taste. I'll probably call it:
platform_set()
as it is implicit that it sets a feature bit.
Okay, fine with me.
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index b43bc24d2bb6..6043ba6cd17d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/platform-feature.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
@@ -566,6 +567,10 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
} else {
/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */
sme_me_mask = me_mask;
+
+ /* Set restricted memory access for virtio. */
+ platform_set_feature(PLATFORM_VIRTIO_RESTRICTED_MEM_ACCESS);
This is way early in the boot, but it appears that marking the platform feature bitmap as __read_mostly puts this in the .data section, so avoids the issue of bss being cleared.
TDX support also uses the arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access() function and will need to be updated.
Seems like a lot of changes, I just wonder if the the arch_has...() function couldn't be updated to also include a Xen check?
Attachment:
OpenPGP_0xB0DE9DD628BF132F.asc
Description: OpenPGP public key
Attachment:
OpenPGP_signature
Description: OpenPGP digital signature