[PATCH 5.10 104/104] x86/boot/compressed/64: Check SEV encryption in the 32-bit boot-path

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Mon May 24 2021 - 12:01:04 EST


From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@xxxxxxx>

commit fef81c86262879d4b1176ef51a834c15b805ebb9 upstream.

Check whether the hypervisor reported the correct C-bit when running
as an SEV guest. Using a wrong C-bit position could be used to leak
sensitive data from the guest to the hypervisor.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210312123824.306-8-joro@xxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 85 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -172,11 +172,21 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup_32)
*/
call get_sev_encryption_bit
xorl %edx, %edx
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
testl %eax, %eax
jz 1f
subl $32, %eax /* Encryption bit is always above bit 31 */
bts %eax, %edx /* Set encryption mask for page tables */
+ /*
+ * Mark SEV as active in sev_status so that startup32_check_sev_cbit()
+ * will do a check. The sev_status memory will be fully initialized
+ * with the contents of MSR_AMD_SEV_STATUS later in
+ * set_sev_encryption_mask(). For now it is sufficient to know that SEV
+ * is active.
+ */
+ movl $1, rva(sev_status)(%ebp)
1:
+#endif

/* Initialize Page tables to 0 */
leal rva(pgtable)(%ebx), %edi
@@ -261,6 +271,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup_32)
movl %esi, %edx
1:
#endif
+ /* Check if the C-bit position is correct when SEV is active */
+ call startup32_check_sev_cbit
+
pushl $__KERNEL_CS
pushl %eax

@@ -787,6 +800,78 @@ SYM_DATA_END(loaded_image_proto)
#endif

/*
+ * Check for the correct C-bit position when the startup_32 boot-path is used.
+ *
+ * The check makes use of the fact that all memory is encrypted when paging is
+ * disabled. The function creates 64 bits of random data using the RDRAND
+ * instruction. RDRAND is mandatory for SEV guests, so always available. If the
+ * hypervisor violates that the kernel will crash right here.
+ *
+ * The 64 bits of random data are stored to a memory location and at the same
+ * time kept in the %eax and %ebx registers. Since encryption is always active
+ * when paging is off the random data will be stored encrypted in main memory.
+ *
+ * Then paging is enabled. When the C-bit position is correct all memory is
+ * still mapped encrypted and comparing the register values with memory will
+ * succeed. An incorrect C-bit position will map all memory unencrypted, so that
+ * the compare will use the encrypted random data and fail.
+ */
+ __HEAD
+ .code32
+SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ pushl %eax
+ pushl %ebx
+ pushl %ecx
+ pushl %edx
+
+ /* Check for non-zero sev_status */
+ movl rva(sev_status)(%ebp), %eax
+ testl %eax, %eax
+ jz 4f
+
+ /*
+ * Get two 32-bit random values - Don't bail out if RDRAND fails
+ * because it is better to prevent forward progress if no random value
+ * can be gathered.
+ */
+1: rdrand %eax
+ jnc 1b
+2: rdrand %ebx
+ jnc 2b
+
+ /* Store to memory and keep it in the registers */
+ movl %eax, rva(sev_check_data)(%ebp)
+ movl %ebx, rva(sev_check_data+4)(%ebp)
+
+ /* Enable paging to see if encryption is active */
+ movl %cr0, %edx /* Backup %cr0 in %edx */
+ movl $(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE), %ecx /* Enable Paging and Protected mode */
+ movl %ecx, %cr0
+
+ cmpl %eax, rva(sev_check_data)(%ebp)
+ jne 3f
+ cmpl %ebx, rva(sev_check_data+4)(%ebp)
+ jne 3f
+
+ movl %edx, %cr0 /* Restore previous %cr0 */
+
+ jmp 4f
+
+3: /* Check failed - hlt the machine */
+ hlt
+ jmp 3b
+
+4:
+ popl %edx
+ popl %ecx
+ popl %ebx
+ popl %eax
+#endif
+ ret
+SYM_FUNC_END(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
+
+/*
* Stack and heap for uncompression
*/
.bss