Re: [PATCH v12 05/13] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command

From: Steve Rutherford
Date: Mon Apr 12 2021 - 20:04:43 EST


On Mon, Apr 12, 2021 at 12:44 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
>
> The command is used for copying the incoming buffer into the
> SEV guest memory space.
>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
> Cc: x86@xxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@xxxxxxx>
> ---
> .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 24 ++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 9 +++
> 3 files changed, 112 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> index c86c1ded8dd8..c6ed5b26d841 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> @@ -372,6 +372,30 @@ On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative va
>
> For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.12.
>
> +14. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA
> +----------------------------
> +
> +The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to copy
> +the incoming buffers into the guest memory region with encryption context
> +created during the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START.
> +
> +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data
> +
> +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
> +
> +::
> +
> + struct kvm_sev_launch_receive_update_data {
> + __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */
> + __u32 hdr_len;
> +
> + __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the destination guest memory region */
> + __u32 guest_len;
> +
> + __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the incoming buffer memory region */
> + __u32 trans_len;
> + };
> +
> References
> ==========
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index e530c2b34b5e..2c95657cc9bf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -1448,6 +1448,82 @@ static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> return ret;
> }
>
> +static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> +{
> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> + struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params;
> + struct sev_data_receive_update_data *data;
> + void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL;
> + struct page **guest_page;
> + unsigned long n;
> + int ret, offset;
> +
> + if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
> + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len ||
> + !params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len ||
> + !params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
> + offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
> + if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
> + if (IS_ERR(hdr))
> + return PTR_ERR(hdr);
> +
> + trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
> + if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
> + goto e_free_hdr;
> + }
> +
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!data)
> + goto e_free_trans;
> +
> + data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
> + data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
> + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(trans);
> + data->trans_len = params.trans_len;
> +
> + /* Pin guest memory */
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
> + PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
> + if (!guest_page)
> + goto e_free;
> +
> + /* The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
> + data->guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) +
> + offset;
> + data->guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
> + data->guest_len = params.guest_len;
> + data->handle = sev->handle;
> +
> + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, data,
> + &argp->error);
> +
> + sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
> +
> +e_free:
> + kfree(data);
> +e_free_trans:
> + kfree(trans);
> +e_free_hdr:
> + kfree(hdr);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
> {
> struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
> @@ -1513,6 +1589,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
> case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START:
> r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
> break;
> + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA:
> + r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
> + break;
> default:
> r = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> index 29c25e641a0c..3a656d43fc6c 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> @@ -1759,6 +1759,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_receive_start {
> __u32 session_len;
> };
>
> +struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data {
> + __u64 hdr_uaddr;
> + __u32 hdr_len;
> + __u64 guest_uaddr;
> + __u32 guest_len;
> + __u64 trans_uaddr;
> + __u32 trans_len;
> +};
> +
> #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0)
> #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1)
> #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)
> --
> 2.17.1
>
Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@xxxxxxxxxx>