Re: [syzbot] BUG: unable to handle kernel access to user memory in schedule_tail

From: Alex Ghiti
Date: Fri Mar 12 2021 - 11:28:26 EST




Le 3/12/21 à 10:12 AM, Dmitry Vyukov a écrit :
On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 2:50 PM Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On 10/03/2021 17:16, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 5:46 PM syzbot
<syzbot+e74b94fe601ab9552d69@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

Hello,

syzbot found the following issue on:

HEAD commit: 0d7588ab riscv: process: Fix no prototype for arch_dup_tas..
git tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux.git fixes
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1212c6e6d00000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=e3c595255fb2d136
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e74b94fe601ab9552d69
userspace arch: riscv64

Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet.

IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+e74b94fe601ab9552d69@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

+riscv maintainers

This is riscv64-specific.
I've seen similar crashes in put_user in other places. It looks like
put_user crashes in the user address is not mapped/protected (?).

I've been having a look, and this seems to be down to access of the
tsk->set_child_tid variable. I assume the fuzzing here is to pass a
bad address to clone?

From looking at the code, the put_user() code should have set the
relevant SR_SUM bit (the value for this, which is 1<<18 is in the
s2 register in the crash report) and from looking at the compiler
output from my gcc-10, the code looks to be dong the relevant csrs
and then csrc around the put_user

So currently I do not understand how the above could have happened
over than something re-tried the code seqeunce and ended up retrying
the faulting instruction without the SR_SUM bit set.

I would maybe blame qemu for randomly resetting SR_SUM, but it's
strange that 99% of these crashes are in schedule_tail. If it would be
qemu, then they would be more evenly distributed...

Another observation: looking at a dozen of crash logs, in none of
these cases fuzzer was actually trying to fuzz clone with some insane
arguments. So it looks like completely normal clone's (e..g coming
from pthread_create) result in this crash.

I also wonder why there is ret_from_exception, is it normal? I see
handle_exception disables SR_SUM:

csrrc does the right thing: it cleans SR_SUM bit in status but saves the previous value that will get correctly restored.

("The CSRRC (Atomic Read and Clear Bits in CSR) instruction reads the value of the CSR, zero-extends the value to XLEN bits, and writes it to integer registerrd. The initial value in integerregisterrs1is treated as a bit mask that specifies bit positions to be cleared in the CSR. Any bitthat is high inrs1will cause the corresponding bit to be cleared in the CSR, if that CSR bit iswritable. Other bits in the CSR are unaffected.")

https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.12-rc2/source/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S#L73

Still no luck for the moment, can't reproduce it locally, my test is maybe not that good (I created threads all day long in order to trigger the put_user of schedule_tail).

Given that the path you mention works most of the time, and that the status register in the stack trace shows the SUM bit is not set whereas it is set in put_user, I'm leaning toward some race condition (maybe an interrupt that arrives at the "wrong" time) or a qemu issue as you mentioned.

To eliminate qemu issues, do you have access to some HW ? Or to different qemu versions ?



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