Re: [PATCH v4] kasan: remove redundant config option

[Walter Wu]

On Fri, 2021-02-26 at 09:25 +0800, Walter Wu wrote:
> CONFIG_KASAN_STACK and CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE both enable KASAN stack
> instrumentation, but we should only need one config, so that we remove
> CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE and make CONFIG_KASAN_STACK workable.  see [1].
> 
> When enable KASAN stack instrumentation, then for gcc we could do no
> prompt and default value y, and for clang prompt and default value n.
> 
> [1]: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210221
> 
> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@xxxxxxxxx>
> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> 
> v4: After this patch sent, someone had modification about KASAN_STACK,
>     so I need to rebase codebase. Thank Andrey for your pointing.
> 
Hi Andrew,

Could you pick this v4 patch up into mm?
Thanks.

Walter

> ---
>  arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S        |  2 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S |  2 +-
>  include/linux/kasan.h            |  2 +-
>  lib/Kconfig.kasan                |  8 ++------
>  mm/kasan/common.c                |  2 +-
>  mm/kasan/kasan.h                 |  2 +-
>  mm/kasan/report_generic.c        |  2 +-
>  scripts/Makefile.kasan           | 10 ++++++++--
>  security/Kconfig.hardening       |  4 ++--
>  9 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
> index 5bfd9b87f85d..4ea9392f86e0 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
> @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
>  	 */
>  	bl	cpu_do_resume
>  
> -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)
>  	mov	x0, sp
>  	bl	kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
>  #endif
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
> index 56b6865afb2a..d5d8a352eafa 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
> @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
>  	movq	pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
>  	movq	pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
>  
> -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)
>  	/*
>  	 * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
>  	 * which we now need to unpoison.
> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> index b91732bd05d7..14f72ec96492 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> @@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_check_byte(const void *address)
>  
>  #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
>  
> -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)
>  void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
>  #else
>  static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
> diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kasan b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> index 624ae1df7984..cffc2ebbf185 100644
> --- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> +++ b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> @@ -138,9 +138,10 @@ config KASAN_INLINE
>  
>  endchoice
>  
> -config KASAN_STACK_ENABLE
> +config KASAN_STACK
>  	bool "Enable stack instrumentation (unsafe)" if CC_IS_CLANG && !COMPILE_TEST
>  	depends on KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS
> +	default y if CC_IS_GCC
>  	help
>  	  The LLVM stack address sanitizer has a know problem that
>  	  causes excessive stack usage in a lot of functions, see
> @@ -154,11 +155,6 @@ config KASAN_STACK_ENABLE
>  	  CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST.	On gcc it is assumed to always be safe
>  	  to use and enabled by default.
>  
> -config KASAN_STACK
> -	int
> -	default 1 if KASAN_STACK_ENABLE || CC_IS_GCC
> -	default 0
> -
>  config KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
>  	bool "Enable memory corruption identification"
>  	depends on KASAN_SW_TAGS
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index b5e08d4cefec..7b53291dafa1 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size)
>  	kasan_unpoison(address, size);
>  }
>  
> -#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
>  /* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */
>  void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
>  {
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> index 8c55634d6edd..3436c6bf7c0c 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
>  const char *kasan_get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info);
>  void kasan_metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row);
>  
> -#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && defined(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)
>  void kasan_print_address_stack_frame(const void *addr);
>  #else
>  static inline void kasan_print_address_stack_frame(const void *addr) { }
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/report_generic.c b/mm/kasan/report_generic.c
> index 41f374585144..de732bc341c5 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/report_generic.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/report_generic.c
> @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ void kasan_metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row)
>  	memcpy(buffer, kasan_mem_to_shadow(row), META_BYTES_PER_ROW);
>  }
>  
> -#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
>  static bool __must_check tokenize_frame_descr(const char **frame_descr,
>  					      char *token, size_t max_tok_len,
>  					      unsigned long *value)
> diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.kasan b/scripts/Makefile.kasan
> index 1e000cc2e7b4..abf231d209b1 100644
> --- a/scripts/Makefile.kasan
> +++ b/scripts/Makefile.kasan
> @@ -2,6 +2,12 @@
>  CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE := -fno-builtin
>  KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET ?= $(CONFIG_KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
>  
> +ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> +	stack_enable := 1
> +else
> +	stack_enable := 0
> +endif
> +
>  ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
>  
>  ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE
> @@ -27,7 +33,7 @@ else
>  	CFLAGS_KASAN := $(CFLAGS_KASAN_SHADOW) \
>  	 $(call cc-param,asan-globals=1) \
>  	 $(call cc-param,asan-instrumentation-with-call-threshold=$(call_threshold)) \
> -	 $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK)) \
> +	 $(call cc-param,asan-stack=$(stack_enable)) \
>  	 $(call cc-param,asan-instrument-allocas=1)
>  endif
>  
> @@ -42,7 +48,7 @@ else
>  endif
>  
>  CFLAGS_KASAN := -fsanitize=kernel-hwaddress \
> -		-mllvm -hwasan-instrument-stack=$(CONFIG_KASAN_STACK) \
> +		-mllvm -hwasan-instrument-stack=$(stack_enable) \
>  		-mllvm -hwasan-use-short-granules=0 \
>  		$(instrumentation_flags)
>  
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> index 269967c4fc1b..a56c36470cb1 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
> +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ choice
>  	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF
>  		bool "zero-init structs passed by reference (strong)"
>  		depends on GCC_PLUGINS
> -		depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK=1)
> +		depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK)
>  		select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
>  		help
>  		  Zero-initialize any structures on the stack that may
> @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ choice
>  	config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
>  		bool "zero-init anything passed by reference (very strong)"
>  		depends on GCC_PLUGINS
> -		depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK=1)
> +		depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK)
>  		select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
>  		help
>  		  Zero-initialize any stack variables that may be passed