Re: [patch 4/8] x86/entry: Move irq tracing on syscall entry to C-code

From: Andy Lutomirski
Date: Sat Feb 29 2020 - 14:25:33 EST




> On Feb 29, 2020, at 6:44 AM, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> ïThomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>> Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>>>>> On Feb 26, 2020, at 12:17 AM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>> ïOn Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 09:43:46PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>>>> Your earlier patches suggest quite strongly that tracing isn't safe
>>>>>> until enter_from_user_mode(). But trace_hardirqs_off() calls
>>>>>> trace_irq_disable_rcuidle(), which looks [0] like a tracepoint.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Did you perhaps mean to do this *after* enter_from_user_mode()?
>>>>>
>>>>> aside from the fact that enter_from_user_mode() itself also has a
>>>>> tracepoint, the crucial detail is that we must not trace/kprobe the
>>>>> function calling this.
>>>>>
>>>>> Specifically for #PF, because we need read_cr2() before this. See later
>>>>> patches.
>>>
>>> Indeed. Iâm fine with this patch, but I still donât understand what
>>> the changelog is about.
>>
>> Yeah, the changelog is not really helpful. Let me fix that.
>>
>>> And Iâm still rather baffled by most of the notrace annotations in the
>>> series.
>>
>> As discussed on IRC, this might be too broad, but then I rather have the
>> actual C-entry points neither traceable nor probable in general and
>> relax this by calling functions which can be traced and probed.
>>
>> My rationale for this decision was that enter_from_user_mode() is marked
>> notrace/noprobe as well, so I kept the protection scope the same as we
>> had in the ASM maze which is marked noprobe already.
>
> I have second thoughts vs. tracing in this context.
>
> While the tracer itself seems to handle this correctly, what about
> things like BPF programs which can be attached to tracepoints and
> function trace entries?

I think that everything using the tracing code, including BPF, should either do its own rcuidle stuff or explicitly not execute if weâre not in CONTEXT_KERNEL. That is, we probably need to patch BPF.

>
> Is that really safe _before_ context tracking has updated RCU state?
>
> Thanks,
>
> tglx
>
>