Re: [PATCH v6 6/7] crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG

[Horia Geanta]

On 1/20/2020 6:38 PM, Horia Geanta wrote:
> On 1/8/2020 5:42 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
>> @@ -275,12 +276,25 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
>>  		return -ENOMEM;
>>  
>>  	for (sh_idx = 0; sh_idx < RNG4_MAX_HANDLES; sh_idx++) {
>> +		const u32 rdsta_if = RDSTA_IF0 << sh_idx;
>> +		const u32 rdsta_pr = RDSTA_PR0 << sh_idx;
>> +		const u32 rdsta_mask = rdsta_if | rdsta_pr;
>>  		/*
>>  		 * If the corresponding bit is set, this state handle
>>  		 * was initialized by somebody else, so it's left alone.
>>  		 */
>> -		if ((1 << sh_idx) & state_handle_mask)
>> -			continue;
>> +		if (rdsta_if & state_handle_mask) {
>> +			if (rdsta_pr & state_handle_mask)
>> +				continue;
>> +
>> +			dev_info(ctrldev,
>> +				 "RNG4 SH%d was previously instantiated without prediction resistance. Tearing it down\n",
>> +				 sh_idx);
>> +
>> +			ret = deinstantiate_rng(ctrldev, rdsta_if);
>> +			if (ret)
>> +				break;
> In case state handle 0 is deinstantiated, its reinstantiation with PR support
> will have the side effect of re-generating JDKEK, TDKEK, TDSK.
> This needs to be avoided, since other SW components (like OP-TEE f/w)
> could have black keys in use. Overwriting the KEK registers would no longer
> allow CAAM to decrypt them.
> 
Never mind, looks like there is logic in place to check whether
keys have been generated or not, by looking at RDSTA[SKVN].

Horia