[PATCH v5 1/5] AppArmor: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED

From: Casey Schaufler
Date: Wed Sep 26 2018 - 16:35:11 EST


From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

A ptrace access check with mode PTRACE_MODE_SCHED gets called
from process switching code. This precludes the use of audit,
as the locking is incompatible. Don't do audit in the PTRACE_MODE_SCHED
case.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@xxxxxxxxx>
---
security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/ipc.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/ipc.c | 8 +++++---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 5 +++--
4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 08c88de0ffda..28300f4c3ef9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct aa_label *to_label,
if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerl))
goto out;

- error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerl, to_label, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+ error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerl, to_label, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, true);

out:
rcu_read_unlock();
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
index 5ffc218d1e74..299d1c45fef0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ struct aa_profile;
"xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost"

int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
- u32 request);
+ u32 request, bool audit);
int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig);

#endif /* __AA_IPC_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index 527ea1557120..9ed110afc822 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -121,15 +121,17 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
* Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
*/
int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
- u32 request)
+ u32 request, bool audit)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);

return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
- profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
- profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
+ profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request,
+ audit ? &sa : NULL),
+ profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest,
+ audit ? &sa : NULL));
}


diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 8b8b70620bbe..da9d0b228857 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
tracee = aa_get_task_label(child);
error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee,
(mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ
- : AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
+ : AA_PTRACE_TRACE,
+ !(mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED));
aa_put_label(tracee);
end_current_label_crit_section(tracer);

@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)

tracee = begin_current_label_crit_section();
tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent);
- error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
+ error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE, true);
aa_put_label(tracer);
end_current_label_crit_section(tracee);

--
2.17.1