[tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments, to reduce speculation attack surface

[tip-bot for Dan Williams]

Commit-ID:  8e1eb3fa009aa7c0b944b3c8b26b07de0efb3200
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/8e1eb3fa009aa7c0b944b3c8b26b07de0efb3200
Author:     Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 17:18:05 -0800
Committer:  Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue, 6 Feb 2018 08:30:27 +0100

x86/entry/64: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments, to reduce speculation attack surface

At entry userspace may have (maliciously) populated the extra registers
outside the syscall calling convention with arbitrary values that could
be useful in a speculative execution (Spectre style) attack.

Clear these registers to minimize the kernel's attack surface.

Note, this only clears the extra registers and not the unused
registers for syscalls less than 6 arguments, since those registers are
likely to be clobbered well before their values could be put to use
under speculation.

Note, Linus found that the XOR instructions can be executed with
minimized cost if interleaved with the PUSH instructions, and Ingo's
analysis found that R10 and R11 should be included in the register
clearing beyond the typical 'extra' syscall calling convention
registers.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151787988577.7847.16733592218894189003.stgit@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[ Made small improvements to the changelog and the code comments. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index c752abe..065a71b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -235,13 +235,26 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe)
 	pushq	%r8				/* pt_regs->r8 */
 	pushq	%r9				/* pt_regs->r9 */
 	pushq	%r10				/* pt_regs->r10 */
+	/*
+	 * Clear extra registers that a speculation attack might
+	 * otherwise want to exploit. Interleave XOR with PUSH
+	 * for better uop scheduling:
+	 */
+	xorq	%r10, %r10			/* nospec   r10 */
 	pushq	%r11				/* pt_regs->r11 */
+	xorq	%r11, %r11			/* nospec   r11 */
 	pushq	%rbx				/* pt_regs->rbx */
+	xorl	%ebx, %ebx			/* nospec   rbx */
 	pushq	%rbp				/* pt_regs->rbp */
+	xorl	%ebp, %ebp			/* nospec   rbp */
 	pushq	%r12				/* pt_regs->r12 */
+	xorq	%r12, %r12			/* nospec   r12 */
 	pushq	%r13				/* pt_regs->r13 */
+	xorq	%r13, %r13			/* nospec   r13 */
 	pushq	%r14				/* pt_regs->r14 */
+	xorq	%r14, %r14			/* nospec   r14 */
 	pushq	%r15				/* pt_regs->r15 */
+	xorq	%r15, %r15			/* nospec   r15 */
 	UNWIND_HINT_REGS
 
 	TRACE_IRQS_OFF