[PATCH 2/2] KVM: nVMX: fixes to nested virt interrupt injection

From: Paolo Bonzini
Date: Fri Jul 28 2017 - 03:11:41 EST


There are three issues in nested_vmx_check_exception:

1) it is not taking PFEC_MATCH/PFEC_MASK into account, as reported
by Wanpeng Li;

2) it should rebuild the interruption info and exit qualification fields
from scratch, as reported by Jim Mattson, because the values from the
L2->L0 vmexit may be invalid (e.g. if an emulated instruction causes
a page fault, the EPT misconfig's exit qualification is incorrect).
This applies to vmx_inject_page_fault_nested as well.

3) CR2 and DR6 should not be written for exception intercept vmexits
(CR2 only for AMD).

This patch fixes the first two and adds a comment about the last,
outlining the fix.

Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 10 +++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 4d8141e533c3..1107626938cc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -2430,6 +2430,16 @@ static int nested_svm_check_exception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned nr,
svm->vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + nr;
svm->vmcb->control.exit_code_hi = 0;
svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = error_code;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: we should not write CR2 when L1 intercepts an L2 #PF exception.
+ * The fix is to add the ancillary datum (CR2 or DR6) to structs
+ * kvm_queued_exception and kvm_vcpu_events, so that CR2 and DR6 can be
+ * written only when inject_pending_event runs (DR6 would written here
+ * too). This should be conditional on a new capability---if the
+ * capability is disabled, kvm_multiple_exception would write the
+ * ancillary information to CR2 or DR6, for backwards ABI-compatibility.
+ */
if (svm->vcpu.arch.exception.nested_apf)
svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = svm->vcpu.arch.apf.nested_apf_token;
else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 18a9a1bb3991..273734379ac8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -927,6 +927,10 @@ static void vmx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
static void copy_vmcs12_to_shadow(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
static void copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
static int alloc_identity_pagetable(struct kvm *kvm);
+static bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+static void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked);
+static bool nested_vmx_is_page_fault_vmexit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
+ u16 error_code);

static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea);
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
@@ -2428,6 +2432,30 @@ static void skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
}

+static void nested_vmx_inject_exception_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned long exit_qual)
+{
+ struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+ unsigned int nr = vcpu->arch.exception.nr;
+ u32 intr_info = nr | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+
+ if (vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code) {
+ vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.error_code;
+ intr_info |= INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
+ }
+
+ if (kvm_exception_is_soft(nr))
+ intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION;
+ else
+ intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION;
+
+ if (!(vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+ vmx_get_nmi_mask(vcpu))
+ intr_info |= INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI;
+
+ nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI, intr_info, exit_qual);
+}
+
/*
* KVM wants to inject page-faults which it got to the guest. This function
* checks whether in a nested guest, we need to inject them to L1 or L2.
@@ -2437,24 +2465,38 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
unsigned int nr = vcpu->arch.exception.nr;

- if (!((vmcs12->exception_bitmap & (1u << nr)) ||
- (nr == PF_VECTOR && vcpu->arch.exception.nested_apf)))
- return 0;
+ if (nr == PF_VECTOR) {
+ if (vcpu->arch.exception.nested_apf) {
+ nested_vmx_inject_exception_vmexit(vcpu,
+ vcpu->arch.apf.nested_apf_token);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * FIXME: we must not write CR2 when L1 intercepts an L2 #PF exception.
+ * The fix is to add the ancillary datum (CR2 or DR6) to structs
+ * kvm_queued_exception and kvm_vcpu_events, so that CR2 and DR6
+ * can be written only when inject_pending_event runs. This should be
+ * conditional on a new capability---if the capability is disabled,
+ * kvm_multiple_exception would write the ancillary information to
+ * CR2 or DR6, for backwards ABI-compatibility.
+ */
+ if (nested_vmx_is_page_fault_vmexit(vmcs12,
+ vcpu->arch.exception.error_code)) {
+ nested_vmx_inject_exception_vmexit(vcpu, vcpu->arch.cr2);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ unsigned long exit_qual = 0;
+ if (nr == DB_VECTOR)
+ exit_qual = vcpu->arch.dr6;

- if (vcpu->arch.exception.nested_apf) {
- vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.error_code;
- nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI,
- PF_VECTOR | INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION |
- INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK,
- vcpu->arch.apf.nested_apf_token);
- return 1;
+ if (vmcs12->exception_bitmap & (1u << nr)) {
+ nested_vmx_inject_exception_vmexit(vcpu, exit_qual);
+ return 1;
+ }
}

- vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
- nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI,
- vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),
- vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
- return 1;
+ return 0;
}

static void vmx_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -9544,10 +9586,11 @@ static void vmx_inject_page_fault_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
WARN_ON(!is_guest_mode(vcpu));

if (nested_vmx_is_page_fault_vmexit(vmcs12, fault->error_code)) {
- vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
- nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason,
- vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),
- vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
+ vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code = fault->error_code;
+ nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI,
+ PF_VECTOR | INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION |
+ INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK,
+ fault->address);
} else {
kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
}
@@ -10130,12 +10173,6 @@ static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
* "or"ing of the EB of vmcs01 and vmcs12, because when enable_ept,
* vmcs01's EB.PF is 0 so the "or" will take vmcs12's value, and when
* !enable_ept, EB.PF is 1, so the "or" will always be 1.
- *
- * A problem with this approach (when !enable_ept) is that L1 may be
- * injected with more page faults than it asked for. This could have
- * caused problems, but in practice existing hypervisors don't care.
- * To fix this, we will need to emulate the PFEC checking (on the L1
- * page tables), using walk_addr(), when injecting PFs to L1.
*/
vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK,
enable_ept ? vmcs12->page_fault_error_code_mask : 0);
--
1.8.3.1