Re: [PATCH] lib/strscpy: avoid KASAN false positive

From: Chris Metcalf
Date: Wed Jul 19 2017 - 11:39:54 EST


On 7/18/2017 6:04 PM, Andrew Morton wrote:
On Wed, 19 Jul 2017 00:31:36 +0300 Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On 07/18/2017 11:26 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 1:15 PM, Andrey Ryabinin
<aryabinin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
No, it does warn about valid users. The report that Dave posted wasn't about wrong strscpy() usage
it was about reading 8-bytes from 5-bytes source string. It wasn't about buggy 'count' at all.
So KASAN will warn for perfectly valid code like this:
char dest[16];
strscpy(dest, "12345", sizeof(dest)):
Ugh, ok, yes.

For strscpy() that would mean making the *whole* read from 'src' buffer unchecked by KASAN.
So we do have that READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(), but could we perhaps have
something that doesn't do a NOCHECK but a partial check and is simply
ok with "this is an optimistc longer access"

This can be dont, I think.

Something like this:
static inline unsigned long read_partial_nocheck(unsigned long *x)
{
unsigned long ret = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(x);
kasan_check_partial(x, sizeof(unsigned long));
return ret;
}

(Cc Chris)

We could just remove all that word-at-a-time logic. Do we have any
evidence that this would harm anything?

The word-at-a-time logic was part of the initial commit since I wanted
to ensure that strscpy could be used to replace strlcpy or strncpy without
serious concerns about performance. It seems unfortunate to remove it
unconditionally to support KASAN, but I haven't looked deeply at the
tradeoffs here.

--
Chris Metcalf, Mellanox Technologies
http://www.mellanox.com