-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----FWIW, on Hardened Gentoo, ping is installed without the SUID bit set, and has the appropriate fscaps attribute to give it CAP_NET_RAW. Sadly, that's about the only tool that is set to use capabilities (the only other one I know of is arping). Ping is however very purpose specific and short of someone re-writing the binary, there really isn't much that could be done to use it for privilege escalation. OTOH even when you use capabilities, it's pretty easy for someone with a little shell scripting knowledge to preform a DOS attack on a network just using ping.
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Am Di den 10. Nov 2015 um 14:35 schrieb Austin S Hemmelgarn:
On 2015-11-10 08:19, Klaus Ethgen wrote:
Hi Ted, hy others in this discussion,I think it's mostly due to the fact that there are a lot of potential
Am Di den 10. Nov 2015 um 13:40 schrieb Theodore Ts'o:
Whether or not that will be acceptable upstream, I don't know, mainly
because I think a strong case can be made that such a patch has an
audience of one, and adding more complexity here for an idea which has
been time-tested over decades to be a failure is just not a good idea.
I wouldn't tell the implementation until now to be a failure. It helped
a lot to keep a system sane. It is true that all distributions ignored
capabilities completely but I don't think that is due the design.
security issues in using capabilities as implemented in Linux (and other
POSIX systems),
Well, of course. If you give a process capabilities, it can use it. That
is in the nature of the problem. But in comparison to SUID, it is
selective rights. That makes it much more troublesome to exploit. Why
the hell is, for example, ping installed SUID root? There is only one
privileged right that is needed instead of all or nothing.
Again, this depends, there really isn't any way to make it impossible to break out of a chroot without significant changes to the kernel, even when using stuff like namespaces.
and unlike chroot(), it's not as easy to protect against stuff trying
to bypass them while still keeping them useful.
It is the same, you have to be aware of the problem and need to mitigate
it.
chroot addresses different thinks than capabilities. And also chroot is
exploitable and you can break out in some cases. You have to do it
right...
The big problem here is stuff like CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_NET_ADMIN, which group together a bunch of things that are only loosely related. For example, both CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_NET_RAW include the ability to bind to non-local addresses, but none of the stuff that I've ever seen that uses CAP_NET_RAW instead of running as root uses that at all. CAP_SYS_ADMIN includes a list of 24 different things that it allows, many of which are themselves lists of other operations.
If you do a web search you can relatively easily find info on how to
use many of the defined capabilities to get root-equivalent access
(CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_SYS_MODULE are obvious, but many of the others
can be used also if you know what you are doing, for example
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE+CAP_SYS_BOOT can be used on non-SecureBoot systems to
force the system to reboot into an arbitrary kernel).
Well, that is like it should be. If you give an exploitable application
rights that it should not have, it can get exploited. But this decision
is in the responsibility of the admin.
Unless you're personally auditing every single piece of code being run on your system, you are inherently trusting the developers anyway.
With ambient capabilities, you transfer that responsibilities to all the
different developers that once in a while wrote a SUID tool (or tool
with raised capabilities). So, tell me, where does the ambient
capabilities raise the security?
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