Re: [capabilities] Allow normal inheritance for a configurable set of capabilities

[Christoph Lameter]

On Tue, 3 Feb 2015, Casey Schaufler wrote:

> > (I wasn't going to ask bc I assumed not, but heck maybe you're bored
> > on a desert island or snowed in and just looking for an excuse to hack :)
>
> Not at all bored, but I think this could be important.

Ok here is a draft of a patch that follows these ideas.

It also adds an ambient field and sets the field if a new capability

	CAP_AMBIENT_MASK

is set. The perm calcualtion is as suggested by Serge.


If CAP_AMBIENT_MASK is set the inheritable caps become the ambient ones.

If it is not set then the ambient caps are copied from the parent.


DRAFT --- not a working patch:

Index: linux/include/linux/capability.h
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/include/linux/capability.h	2015-02-03 13:25:03.000000000 -0600
+++ linux/include/linux/capability.h	2015-02-03 13:39:23.385424676 -0600
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
 	__u32 magic_etc;
 	kernel_cap_t permitted;
 	kernel_cap_t inheritable;
+	kernel_cap_t ambient;
 };

 #define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE  (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
Index: linux/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/include/uapi/linux/capability.h	2014-07-10 16:10:29.814424392 -0500
+++ linux/include/uapi/linux/capability.h	2015-02-03 13:26:13.231081452 -0600
@@ -351,8 +351,10 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {

 #define CAP_AUDIT_READ		37

+/* Set the current inheritable mask as the ambient inheritable mask */
+#define CAP_AMBIENT_MASK	38

-#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_AMBIENT_MASK

 #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)

Index: linux/security/commoncap.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/security/commoncap.c	2015-02-03 13:25:03.000000000 -0600
+++ linux/security/commoncap.c	2015-02-03 13:43:16.317859741 -0600
@@ -349,17 +349,24 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_cap
 	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
 		__u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
 		__u32 inheritable = caps->inheritable.cap[i];
+		__u32 ambient = caps->ambient.cap[i];

 		/*
 		 * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
 		 */
 		new->cap_permitted.cap[i] =
 			(new->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) |
-			(new->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable);
+			(new->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable) |
+			(ambient & inheritable);

 		if (permitted & ~new->cap_permitted.cap[i])
 			/* insufficient to execute correctly */
 			ret = -EPERM;
+
+		if (capable(CAP_AMBIENT_MASK))
+			new->cap_ambient.cap[i] = inheritable;
+		else
+			new->cap_ambient.cap[i] = ambient;
 	}

 	/*
Index: linux/include/linux/cred.h
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/include/linux/cred.h	2014-12-18 11:17:49.731948737 -0600
+++ linux/include/linux/cred.h	2015-02-03 13:37:32.701019201 -0600
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ struct cred {
 	kernel_cap_t	cap_permitted;	/* caps we're permitted */
 	kernel_cap_t	cap_effective;	/* caps we can actually use */
 	kernel_cap_t	cap_bset;	/* capability bounding set */
+	kernel_cap_t	cap_ambient;	/* Ambient inherited caps */
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 	unsigned char	jit_keyring;	/* default keyring to attach requested
 					 * keys to */


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