Re: [PATCH 2/2] groups: Allow unprivileged processes to use setgroups to drop groups

[One Thousand Gnomes]

> optional), I can do that too.  The security model of "having a group
> gives you less privilege than not having it" seems crazy, but
> nonetheless I can see a couple of easy ways that we can avoid breaking

It's an old pattern of use that makes complete sense in a traditional
Unix permission world because it's the only way to do "exclude {list}"
nicely. Our default IMHO shouldn't break this.

> that pattern, no_new_privs being one of them.  I'd like to make sure
> that nobody sees any other real-world corner case that unprivileged
> setgroups would break.

Barring the usual risk of people doing improper error checking I don't
see one immediately.

For containers I think it actually makes sense that the sysctl can be
applied per container anyway.

Alan
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