Re: [PATCH 00/12] Add kdbus implementation

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 3:25 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 03:19:21PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 3:00 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman
>> <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> >  * Attachment of trustable metadata to each message on demand, such as
>> >    the sending peer's timestamp, creds, auxgroups, comm, exe, cmdline,
>> >    cgroup path, capabilities, security label, audit information, etc,
>> >    each taken at the time the sender issued the ioctl to send the
>> >    message. Which of those are actually recorded and attached is
>> >    controlled by the receiving peer.
>>
>> I think that each piece of trustable metadata needs to be explicitly
>> opted-in to by the sender at the time of capture.  Otherwise you're
>> asking for lots of information leaks and privilege escalations.  This
>> is especially important given that some of the items in the current
>> list could be rather sensitive.
>
> You do have to opt-in for this information at time of capture, so I
> don't understand the issue here.  This is the same type of thing that
> dbus does today, and I don't see the information leaks happening there,
> do you?
>

The docs suggest that the *receiver* opts in.

I don't think that current dbus has severe information leaks because
the total scope for information transparently sent to dbus is rather
small (struct ucred only, presumably).

--Andy
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