[v2.6.34-stable 035/213] net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data

From: Paul Gortmaker
Date: Wed Feb 05 2014 - 15:04:22 EST

From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@xxxxxxxxxx>

This is a commit scheduled for the next v2.6.34 longterm release.
If you see a problem with using this for longterm, please comment.

commit b5c37fe6e24eec194bb29d22fdd55d73bcc709bf upstream.

On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material
should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do
with e.g. auth keys when released.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
net/sctp/endpointola.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
index 7ec09ba03a1c..e80ba5def747 100644
--- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
@@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
/* Final destructor for endpoint. */
static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
+ int i;
SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return);

/* Free up the HMAC transform. */
@@ -272,6 +274,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)

+ for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i)
+ memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE);
/* Remove and free the port */
if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash)

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