Re: security review needed - Re: [PATCH] ohci: Turn remote DMAsupport into a module parameter

[Stefan Richter]

On Dec 23 Stefan Richter wrote:
> On Dec 22 Lubomir Rintel wrote:
> > This makes it possible to debug kernel over FireWire without the need to
> > recompile it.
> > 
> > Cc: Stefan Richter <stefanr@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@xxxxx>
> 
> Looks good to me.  A load-time option is preferable over a compile-time
> option not only from the POV of the debugging use case, but also from the
> maintenance POV.
> 
> It weakens security in two scenarios though, AFAICS:
> 
> A)
>   - There are firewire-ohci and firewire-sbp2 installed on the machine,
>   - the attacker cannot upload code
>   - but can load kernel modules
>   - and has physical access to a 1394 port
>   - and is not able to run a minimal SBP-2 target on the remote 1394 end.
> 
> B)
>   - There is firewire-ohci but not firewire-sbp2 installed on the machine,
>   - the attacker cannot upload code
>   - but can load kernel modules
>   - and has physical access to a 1394 port.
> 
> (In both scenarios, the attacker additionally has to be able to /un/load
> kernel modules if firewire-ohci was loaded already before the attack.)
> 
> That's both quite specific.  Hence the security impact of this patch is
> negligible in my opinion.  Any other opinions or insights into it?

Since there were no objections, I committed it to linux1394.git master
and for-next now.
-- 
Stefan Richter
-=====-====- ---= -==--
http://arcgraph.de/sr/
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