On Tue, Sep 24, 2013 at 10:28:41AM -0400, Daniel De Graaf wrote:On 09/23/2013 06:23 PM, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 06:00:46PM -0400, Daniel De Graaf wrote:
In a PC client TPM, normal OS code (as opposed to firmware or microcode)
is already restricted to locality 0-2. It may make sense to restrict
locality 2 to the kernel, which would allow an in-kernel TPM seal
command to be able to bind data so that userspace cannot unseal it.
However, only allowing localities 0 and 1 to userspace may be too
restrictive if userspace also wishes to use locality for separation,
since locality 1 does not have the ability to reset any PCRs that
locality 0 cannot also reset.
The kernel could reserve only locality 1 for its own use, giving it the
ability to seal data but not interfering with the ability to reset PCRs.
This would be my preference, although it is less intuitive to allow code
of lower privilege (userspace) to control the higher numbered locality
2.
This matches my vague understanding (we don't use localities here)
Perhaps a .config option would be useful to allow the system designer to
choose what, if any, locality to reserve for kernel use?
A runtime sysfs seems reasonable..
Allowing a userspace application to change which locality is kernel- and
userspace-only will eliminate the primary benefit of having a locality
restricted to the kernel.
Right, I was sort of thinking these sysfs files would be write-once or
trapped doored to prevent going backwards (like how secure level
worked). Ideally the write would be in the initramfs, which is part of
the PCR computation, so it should have the same properties as CONFIG_?
I think using CONFIG_ options would make this feature unavaiable to
distro kernel users...
At least "supported_localities" should be generated by the driver if it
is generated at all. There are a few different proposals for handling
localities over 4 in virtual TPMs; one is that locality numbers between
32-255 would be permitted and 5-31 made non-addressable. While this
would work with a bitmask, I'm not sure that is the best solution.
Hmm, a 256 bit wide mask isn't impossible, not sure what other
options are good. Do you think userspace needs to know what localities
are valid or is an ioctl scan sufficient?
Perhaps:
default_locality - default to CONFIG_USER_DEFAULT_LOCALITY
sysfs node permissions 0644
kernel_locality - default to #CONFIG_KERNEL_DEFAULT_LOCALITY
0444 if CONFIG_KERNEL_ONLY_LOCALITY=y
0644 if CONFIG_KERNEL_ONLY_LOCALITY=n
ioctl TPM_{GET,SET}_LOCALITY on an open /dev/tpmX
If CONFIG_KERNEL_ONLY_LOCALITY=y, the userspace locality is not
permitted to be equal to kernel_locality (but may take any other valid
value). Drivers may reject locality values that they consider invalid
(the default should be to only allow 0-4, which is all that is defined
in the spec) or may fail on attempted use of the TPM by passing down an
error from the hardware - I would expect the latter to be the case on
attempts to use locality 4 in the tpm_tis driver.
Seems resonable, CONFIG_KERNEL_ONLY_LOCALITY could be
CONFIG_TPM_ONE_TIME_LOCALITY (eg you get to set kernel_locality only
once)
The only one I see immediately is seal/unseal (security/keys/trusted.c).
The invocation of the seal command would need to be changed to seal the
trusted keys to the kernel-only locality in order to take advantage of
the increased protection provided by a kernel-only locality.
Right
Do you know anyone on the userspace SW side who could look at this?
I should be able to find someone.
Okay, let me know. I'd like to get a few more clean ups done before
mucking with the sysfs, but the way forward for locality looks pretty
clear..
Thanks,
Jason