Re: [PATCH 01/12] Add BSD-style securelevel support

From: H. Peter Anvin
Date: Mon Sep 09 2013 - 12:27:29 EST


On 09/09/2013 08:49 AM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> Provide a coarse-grained runtime configuration option for restricting
> userspace's ability to modify the running kernel.
>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> Documentation/security/securelevel.txt | 23 +++++++
> include/linux/security.h | 8 +++
> security/Kconfig | 8 +++
> security/Makefile | 1 +
> security/securelevel.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 156 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/security/securelevel.txt
> create mode 100644 security/securelevel.c
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/securelevel.txt b/Documentation/security/securelevel.txt
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..a1355a0
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/security/securelevel.txt
> @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
> +Linux securelevel interface
> +---------------------------
> +
> +The Linux securelevel interface (inspired by the BSD securelevel interface)
> +is a runtime mechanism for configuring coarse-grained kernel-level security
> +restrictions. It provides a runtime configuration variable at
> +/sys/kernel/security/securelevel which can be written to by root. The
> +following values are supported:
> +
> +-1: Permanently insecure mode. This level is equivalent to level 0, but once
> + set cannot be changed.
> +
> +0: Insecure mode (default). This level imposes no additional kernel
> + restrictions.
> +
> +1: Secure mode. If set, userspace will be unable to perform direct access
> + to PCI devices, port IO access, access system memory directly via
> + /dev/mem and /dev/kmem, perform kexec_load(), use the userspace
> + software suspend mechanism, insert new ACPI code at runtime via the
> + custom_method interface or modify CPU MSRs (on x86). Certain drivers
> + may also limit additional interfaces.
> +

This will break or have to be redefined once you have signed kexec.

-hpa


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