Re: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernatesnapshot

[Matthew Garrett]

On Sun, Sep 01, 2013 at 12:41:22PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:

> But if you don't generate fresh keys on every boot, the persistent
> keys are mor exposed to other UEFI applications.  Correct me if I'm
> wrong, but I don't think UEFI variables are segregated between
> different UEFI applications, so if anyone gets a generic UEFI variable
> dumper (or setter) signed by the trusted key, this cryptographic
> validation of hibernate snapshots is bypassable.

If anyone can execute arbitrary code in your UEFI environment then 
you've already lost.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
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