Re: [PATCH] ima: prevent dead lock when a file is opened for direct io

From: Kasatkin, Dmitry
Date: Wed Feb 27 2013 - 04:21:27 EST

On Wed, Feb 27, 2013 at 1:22 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Tue, 2013-02-26 at 20:34 +0000, Al Viro wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 02:32:08PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>> > Before anything gets access to the file, the file needs to be measured,
>> > appraised, and/or audited, based on policy. If IMA-appraisal is enabled
>> > and the file is in policy, we enforce local file integrity and return
>> > -EINVAL on failure, similar to LSMs.
>> >
>> > Appraising the file is a two step process. Before appraising the file
>> > data's integrity, we verify the integrity of the file metadata. Included
>> > in the 'security.evm' calculation is the ino, generation, uid, gid,
>> > mode, uuid, and the security xattrs. 'security.ima' contains the file
>> > data hash or a signature based on the hash.
>> >
>> > The i_mutex is held when making file metadata changes (eg. xattrs,
>> > chmod, ...). We hold the i_mutex through the entire verification,
>> > preventing the file data/metadata from changing.
>> ->i_mutex is *not* guaranteed to prevent file data changes. It does
>> cover metadata, but that's it. ->write() is not required to take it.
>> Note, BTW, that as soon as you've dropped ->i_mutex, the metadata can
>> be changed by somebody else.
> Any time file metadata included in the HMAC is updated, 'security.evm'
> is updated to reflect the change. But before 'security.evm' is updated,
> evm_verify_current_integrity() verifies the existing value.
>> What do you achieve by holding it over the vfs_read() call?
> - Before calculating the file hash, verifying it against the digest in
> 'security.ima' and storing the verification status in the iint, we check
> the iint to see whether it was previously verified. By taking the
> i_mutex and keeping it, we prevent the file from being hashed multiple
> times.
> - Prior to IMA-appraisal, on file close only the iint was updated,
> reflecting the fact that the file would need to be re-measured and added
> to the measurement list the next time it was opened. With
> IMA-appraisal, on file close, not only do we need to reflect this change
> in the iint, but we also need to update the 'security.ima' xattr to
> reflect the new hash value. Having the iint specific lock caused a
> lockdep. In one case, we took the i_mutex followed by the iint lock,
> while in the other case, the iint lock was taken before the i_mutex.
>> > I guess I wasn't clear here. IMA always takes the i_mutex, regardless
>> > of the O_DIRECT flag. When a file is opened for read,
>> > process_measurement() takes the i_mutex and then, if the file was opened
>> > with the O_DIRECT flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() attempts to take the
>> > i_mutex again, causing the lockdep.
>> *sigh*
>> Do you actually disagree with my description of the locking rules you
>> implicitly rely upon?
> Obsolutely not! I misunderstood what you were saying. The word
> 'unless' was confusing.
>> Suppose wankfs_file_read() happens to grab
>> ->i_mutex for some reason; without IMA it used to be perfectly legitimate.
>> With IMA it will deadlock as soon as IMA decides that such file is worth
>> its attention. So these days the rule has (silently) become
>> * ->read() on a regular file is not allowed to touch ->i_mutex
>> and with your proposed change it becomes (still undocumented)
>> * ->read() on a regular file is not allowed to touch ->i_mutex unless
>> O_DIRECT is present in file flags at the moment of ->read()
>> Correct?
> yes, unfortunately. What would you suggest?

The main purpose of taking i_mutex is to ensure that measured content
of the file (vfs_read) is in sync with extended attribute values.

If in overall taking a i_mutex before calling vsf_read is
fundamentally wrong, then one of the solutions is to introduce back
the usage of IMA specific mutex.
iint->mutex was removed because it caused dead locking due different
locking order in different cases.

- Dmitry

> thanks,
> Mimi
> --
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