Re: [RFC PATCH] fips: check whether a module registering an alg ortemplate is signed

From: Kyle McMartin
Date: Wed Feb 06 2013 - 11:16:20 EST


On Wed, Feb 06, 2013 at 09:02:46AM +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> On 05.02.2013 23:58:30, +0100, Kyle McMartin <kyle@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Hi Kyle,
>

Thanks for the review, Stephan.

> Just reading this paragraph, there is one missing puzzle piece: the
> *entire* kernel crypto API must shut down, even if only one kernel
> module with one cipher (or block chaining mode, ...) has a broken signature.
>
> The overall requirement is: if one self test fails, the entire FIPS
> 140-2 crypto module must become unavailable. (please note and do not get
> confused by the overload of the term "module" -- we have the KOs the
> kernel loads, and we have something called a FIPS 140-2 module which is
> the entire crypto "library" subject to a FIPS 140-2 validation)
>
> This signature check is one self test required at runtime.
>
> I added comments inline into the patch.
>
> >
> > crypto_sig_check should return 1 (and allow the registration) if any
> > of the following are true:
> > + if (!crypto_sig_check(alg->cra_module))
> > + return -EINVAL;
>
> Instead of an EINVAL, the kernel either must panic(), or a global flag
> is introduced which is evaluated by every kernel crypto API call. If
> that flag is, say, false, none of the kernel crypto API calls must succeed.

Returning -EINVAL means the module does not successfully load, and
nothing is registered. I don't see why you would need to taint or panic,
if nothing untoward actually occured? I don't object to it, if it's
necessary, I just didn't think it was. If Herbert doesn't object to this
patch, I'd move the panic from kernel/module.c to here.

> > +
> > return crypto_set_driver_name(alg);
> > }
> >
> > @@ -435,6 +438,11 @@ int crypto_register_template(struct crypto_template *tmpl)
>
>
> I am wondering whether the modification of these two functions are
> sufficient. As I wrote in a previous email, there are a number of
> register functions the kernel crypto API exports and which are used.
>

Between these two, I believe all codepaths that could bring in a
mode, cipher, or other cryptographic algorithm are covered.

> > goto out;
> > }

regards, Kyle
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/