Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

[Florian Weimer]

* James Bottomley:

> Right, but what I'm telling you is that by deciding to allow automatic
> first boot, you're causing the windows attack vector problem.  You could
> easily do a present user test only on first boot which would eliminate
> it.

Apparently, the warning will look like this:

  WARNING: This Binary is unsigned

  Are you sure you wish to run an unsigned binary
  in a secure environment?

  To avoid this question in future place the platform into setup mode
  See http://www.linuxfoundation.org/uefi-setup-mode
  And reboot.

I'm not convinced this will work because users will confirm their
presence to get back into the system.  We expect GNU/Linux users to do
it, why wouldn't Windows users?  (And what harm can an unsigned binary
do to a "secure environment", anyway?  If it's adversely affected, it
can't be that secure, can it?)

And what's the backup plan if users use this to boot into compromised
Windows systems?
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