Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

[Matthew Garrett]

On Thu, Nov 01, 2012 at 03:06:54PM +0000, Alan Cox wrote:
> > The entire point of this feature is that it's no longer possible to turn 
> > a privileged user exploit into a full system exploit. Gaining admin 
> > access on Windows 8 doesn't permit you to install a persistent backdoor, 
> 
> Really, that would be a first. Do you have a detailed knowledge of
> windows 8 actual security ?

http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/hh848061%28v=vs.85%29.aspx

> > unless there's some way to circumvent that. Which there is, if you can 
> > drop a small Linux distribution onto the ESP and use a signed, trusted 
> > bootloader to boot a signed, trusted kernel that then resumes from an 
> > unsigned, untrusted hibernate image. So we have to ensure that that's 
> > impossible.
> 
> Well if you want to make Linux entirely robust Red Hat could start
> helping with some of the 6000 odd coverity matches some of which will
> most certainly turn out to be real flaws.

Sure, bugs should be fixed.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/