Re: [PATCH 1/4] module: add syscall to load module from fd

[Kees Cook]

On Thu, Sep 20, 2012 at 7:22 PM, James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Thu, 20 Sep 2012, Kees Cook wrote:
>
>> Earlier proposals for appending signatures to kernel modules would not be
>> useful in Chrome OS, since it would involve adding an additional set of
>> keys to our kernel and builds for no good reason: we already trust the
>> contents of our root filesystem. We don't need to verify those kernel
>> modules a second time. Having to do signature checking on module loading
>> would slow us down and be redundant. All we need to know is where a
>> module is coming from so we can say yes/no to loading it.
>
> Just out of interest, has anyone else expressed interest in using this
> feature?

Yes, in the earlier threads, Mimi spoke up in favor of it as a
possible path for IMA to do signature checking. She sent patches that
updated the LSM hooks to include callback to IMA that were sent to the
lsm list:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-security-module&m=134739023306344&w=2

Serge and Eric both Acked the new hooks too.

-Kees

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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