Re: [PATCH 07/12] random: use the arch-specific rng inxfer_secondary_pool

[Theodore Ts'o]

On Sun, Jul 08, 2012 at 02:06:46AM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> 
> Surely the number of random bytes being added is i * sizeof(long), not
> sizeof(u.hwrand)?
> 

Meh; Kees Cook has made the same observation.  Basically, in the
unlikely case where RDRAND fails, we'll end up mixing in stack
garbage.  It's not a security vulnerability, since the contents of the
entropy pool never gets exposed.  In fact, one could argue that mixing
in some unknown garbage from the kernel stack might actually help a
little; but it can't hurt.

					- Ted
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